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Abstract.

We investigate how the ability of the government to depart from budget
balance and issue debt expands the set of equilibria that can be supported
using lump-sum tax-transfer instruments.
We show how this depends on the restrictions on the capacity to tax and
make transfer payments, and what this implies for the government's ability to
issue debt.

Central to our analysis is the definition of solvency for an

infinite-lived government in an infinite-lived economy with finite-lived
households.

Our specification is derived from the non-negativity constraints

on the capital stock and on private consumption by all generations.

Under

fairly tight restrictions on the government's tax-transfer menu our solvency
constraint implies the conventional solvency constraint.
With unrestricted taxes and transfers Ponzi finance is always possible
but "inessential": it does not expand the set of equilibria that can be
supported.
restricted.

Ponzi finance can be "essential" when taxes and transfers are
The paper establishes a number of results that demonstrate how

the ability to issue debt allows restricted tax-transfer schemes to support
all equilibria attainable using unrestricted taxes and transfers.
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(I) INTRODUCTION.
Does the ability of the government to depart from budget balance and
issue or retire debt expand or alter the set of equilibria that can be
supported? Ve address this question for the case in which fiscal policy,
involving, in addition to borrowing, the use of lump-sum taxes and transfers
only, can be used for redistribution and insurance among heterogeneous
households 1 • Heterogeneity is introduced using an OLG model without private
intergenerational gifts2.
The answer turns out to depend crucially on the richness of the set of
lump-sum tax-transfer instruments available and on the restrictions that this
implies for the government's ability to issue debt.

Central to the argument

is our solvency constraint for an infinite-lived government 3 in infinite-lived
economy with overlapping generations of finite-lived households.

The

government is solvent if its budgetary and financing policies are feasible
currently and in all future periods.

In our model, government solvency is

expressed as a set of three inequality constraints on admissible tax,
transfer, public debt and exhaustive public spending sequences.

They are

derived from the requirement that the capital stock and private consumption by
each generation be non-negative in each period.

In other words, solvency for

the infinite-lived government is derived from the (well-understood)
requirement of solvency (or non-bankruptcy) for each finite-lived household.
Consider economies in which the long-run real interest rate is above the
long-run growth rate of efficiency labor.

Under fairly tight restrictions on

the ability of the government to use taxes and transfers freely, our solvency
constraint implies the conventional solvency constraint, that the sequence of
real public debt discounted at the real interest rate converges to zero.

The

first sufficient condition is that net transfer payments by the government to
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a generation during a period cannot change sign (from positive when young to
negative when old) over that generation's life cycle.

The second sufficient

condition is that the long-run growth rate of transfers to the young and taxes
on the old is less than the long-run interest rate.

If, for instance, taxes

and transfers cannot grow faster in the long run than efficiency labor, or
equivalently, if the ratio of taxes paid (transfers received) during a period
by a generation to the value of the physical resources owned by it, is
bounded, the second sufficient condition would be met.
Under less restrictive conditions on taxes and transfers, Ponzi finance
may be possible, regardless of the relationship between the long-run real
interest rate and the long-run real growth rate, and regardless of whether the
economy is dynamically efficient or Pareto-efficient.

We distinguish between

essential Ponzi finance, that is Ponzi schemes that expand the set of

equilibria for consumption and capital formation that can be supported, and
inessential Ponzi finance that does not have any real effects.

The same

essential-inessential distinction is made for public debt as such.

Whether or

not public debt (Ponzi finance) is essential depends on the restrictions
imposed on the government's ability to use taxes and transfers.
We establish three equivalence results4.

The first states that with

unrestricted time- and age-specific taxes and transfers, the ability to depart
from budget balance does not permit additional equilibria to be supported.
Specifically, any intergenerational redistribution and insurance that can be
provided with government borrowing or lending can also be provided with a
balanced government budget.
The second states that, if there are restrictions on the government's
ability to levy age-specific taxes and make age-specific transfers during any
given period, then the option of unbalancing the budget enhances the set of
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equilibria that can be supported.

Specifically, if the government is

constrained to have only age-independent taxes and transfers, the ability to
unbalance the budget permits the government to support all the equilibria that
can be supported with unrestricted age-specific taxes and transfers.
This second proposition will not in general hold if the conventional
government solvency constraint is imposed, and requires our less restrictive
solvency constraint in order to be valid.

Essential Ponzi finance

characterizes the age-independent tax-transfer policies.
Our third equivalence proposition is that even rather severe restrictions
on the variation of taxes and transfers over the lifetime of a generation do
not restrict the equilibria that can be supported, provided unbalanced budgets
are permitted.

This result holds under the conventional solvency constraint

and does not require Ponzi finance.
The substitution of government borrowing for current lump-sum taxes (and
such further future changes in lump-sum taxes, transfers and borrowing as may
be required to preserve government solvency) will affect the equilibrium of an
economy if it redistributes resources among private agents with different
marginal propensities to spend.

In the Samuelson [1958] overlapping

generations (OLG) model used in our paper, there is heterogeneity between
generations.

Typically, postponing taxation through borrowing or

redistributing directly from the young to the old will reduce aggregate
saving.

Such "financial crowding out" has been a central theme of

macroeconomics.
Alternative government financing policies not only effect redistribution
among generations, in a stochastic environment they will also permit trades
across states of nature or intergenerational insurance.
a rich literature on this subject.

There is by now quite

Such intergenerational redistribution schemes
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as social security taxes and retirement benefits can provide insurance that either
cannot be provided by the market or is provided inefficiently 5 •
incomplete market participation.

OLG models have

Because individual households cannot enter

into insurance contracts before they are born, there may be incomplete
risk-sharing (Blanchard and Veil [1992]).

Even in a dynamically efficient

economy, the public provision of this insurance can have implications for
Pareto-efficiency (see Zilcha [1990] and Blanchard and Veil [1992]). 6
Rather than investigating the many interesting positive and welfare aspects
of intergenerational redistribution and of the provision of intergenerational
insurance through the government budget (see e.g. Fischer [1983], Enders and
Lapan [1982], Stiglitz [1983], Merton [1984], Gordon and Varian [1988] and Gale
[1990]), we shall focus on the two equivalence results, on the implications of

our definition of government solvency, on the conditions under which Ponzi
finance is possible and on the role of Ponzi finance.
The outline of the rest of this paper is as follows.
the model.

Section II develops

Section III introduces our government solvency constraint, relates

it to the conventional solvency constraint and discusses what it implies for
the scope for Ponzi finance.
results

Section IV contains our three equivalence

and analyzes how they depend on the ability of the government to

engage in Ponzi finance.

Section V concludes.

(II) THE IODEL.

Consider the closed economy one-good version of Diamond's [1965]
two-period OLG model with government borrowing or lending and lump-sum taxes
or transfers.

Individuals of the same generation are identical.

Successive

generations have the same utility functions and maximize expected utility.
People live for two periods, work in the first period of life and retire 1n

5

the second.

There is no intergenerational gift or bequest motive.

supply is inelastic and scaled to unity for each young worker.

Labor

The young

have access to two stores of value, claims on risky real capital and potentially
risky public debt. 7
The optimization problem of a competitive representative consumer born in
period t is given in equations (II.2) and (II.3a,b).

i

i

ct and rt , i

=

1, 2, are
consumption, respectively taxes paid, by a member of generation t in the ith

period of her life.

wt is the wage rate in period t.

kt and ht are the amounts of

capital, respectively bonds or securities, held by a member of generation t at
the end of period t.

For simplicity, all securities are assumed to have a

one-period maturity.

Pt is the price in period t of a security that entitles

one to a gross payment (coupon) of 'lt+l units of output in period t+1, with
rn

> 'lt+ 1 > 0.

This payment may be stochastic.

The one-period interest rate on

debt carried into period t+l, rt+l is defined by
(II.1)

Pt+ 1 is the rental rate of a unit of capital in period t+ 1.

Et is the expectation

operator conditional on information held at the beginning of period t.
1
2
8
(II.2)
max
v ( c t) + ,BEt v( ct)
1 d d 2
ct ,kt 'bt,ct
subject to the sequence of budget constraints given in (II.3a,b).
1
1
-d
-d
(II.3a)
wt - 7 t - ct ~ kt + ptbt
-d
2
2
-d
(II.3b)
g io
ct + rt ~ (1 + Pt+l)kt + 'lt+1bt
Since utility is strictly increasing in c 1 and c2 , (II.3a,b) will hold with
equality.
The interior first-order conditions for a member of generation tare
(II.4a)

v'(c!)

= ,8Et[(l

(II .4b)

v' ( c!)
.

=

+ Pt+l)v'(c;)J

LEtbt+lv' (c;)J
Pt

= ,BEt [(1

+ rt+l)v' (c;)J

11
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Output Y is produced by a twice continuously differentiable production
function with constant returns to capital K and labor in efficiency units BL and
yt
Kt
positive and diminishing marginal products: 7r:J':": = Yt = f(7r:J':":) = f(kt) '
t t
t t
f' > O; f'' < 0 . It also satisfies the Inada conditions. Productivity is modeled
as labor-augmenting.

Lis labor in natural units and 0 the level of

labor-augmenting productivity.

0 can be random and is assumed to have positive

support; for finite t, Otis also assumed to be bounded from above.

Our

equivalence results do not depend on this particular parameterization of uncertainty.
The growth rate of labor-augmenting productivity wt is defined by
1 + wt

= Otl ot-1 ·

The labor market and capital rental market are competitive and clear, so

(II.5)

wt

(II.6)

Pt+l

=

Ot[f(kt) - ktf' (kt)]
=

f (kt+l) .
I

The government imposes lump-sum taxes (transfers when negative) on the
young and/or the old, spends a non-negative amount on public consumption 12 and
satisfies its single-period budget identity by borrowing or lending.

Bt is

the stock of government bonds at the beginning of period t and Gt the amount
of exhaustive public spending.

The single-period government budget identity

is

ptBt+J

= 1tBt

+

Gt -

1

7 tLt

-

2

7 t-1Lt-1

Population (assumed equal to the labor force) grows at the constant
proportional rate n > -1.

By choice of units we set 1 = 1. Vith
0
bt = Bt/(OtLt), and gt= Gt/(OtLt), the single-period government budget
identity can be rewritten as

(II. 7)

7

The economy-wide asset market equilibrium conditions are given by
-d
9 t+1 = 1tbt
-d
Kt+l = Ltkt

Substituting the asset market equilibrium conditions into (II.3a) yields:
(II.8)
(ptbt+J + kt+J)(J + n)(l+wt+l) = ( wt - rt1 - ct1) 0t-1 .
The lump-sum taxes levied (transfers paid) by the government and the
coupon payment on the public debt can be stochastic. We assume for simplicity
that the government does not introduce additional noise into the system (Gt is
non-stochastic), but that taxes and debt coupon payments can be made contingent
on current and past realizations of the random variable 0.
of current and past realizations of 0, that is et
1

Tt

(II.9b)

7

(II.9c)

7t = 7t (et)

t

i

~

O}.

1

(II. 9a)

2

={0t-i;

Let et be the sequence

Tt(et)
7

2

t (et+l)

(III) GOVERNMENT SOLVENCY AND PONZI FINANCE IN AN INFINITE-LIVED ECONOMY.
Solving the government single-period budget identity forward in time for
T

~

0 periods, we get for all t

(III .1)

(III .2)

8

~

0

T-1

b = ~(0

[ 1
)-1 Tt+i +

t-lpt-1 t - £.. t+i+1
l+n
i=O
+ 8t-1+TPt-1+Tbt+T
t+i
(1+n) (l+w. 1)]
8t+/ =
[
1-+-r-._...._J+_ for t+i > O .
j=O
J
for t+i = -1
=1

II -~

Ve also define the market discount factor A as follows:
t+i
1
At+i = I1[1 + r.J = 8t+i/(Ot+i+1 1t+i+1).
J·=o

J

8

Note that 8 is the "labor-force-growth-and-productivity-growth -adjusted"
discount factor.

Both At +l. and 8t +l. are assumed to be positive for finite

values of t+i and non-negative in the limit as t+i~w .
The conventional government solvency constraint, given 1n (III.3)
requires the discounted public debt to vanish in the long run for any realization
of the discounted debt sequence.
(III. 3)

lim 8t-1+TPt-1+Tbt+T
1'-iw

= lim
1'-iw

At-1+TPt-1+TBt+T = O.
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Equations (III.3) implies (III.4)
(III.4)

8t-1Pt-1bt

T-1
[ 1
~
-1 T t+i
lim ~( 8t+i+1)
l+n +
T~w i=
. O
.

=

14

The solvency condition (III.3) has the prima facie attractive property of
implying the same kind of present value or intertemporal budget constraint
(III.4) for the infinite horizon case as for the finite horizon case.

If

t-1+T is the finite terminal period, then the standard (and uncontroversial)
government solvency constraint is Pt-l+Tbt+T $ 0 (the government doesn't owe
anything at the end of the last period).
that Pt-l+Tbt+T

~

0.

A rational household sector ensures

From (III.1) these two weak inequalities imply, that the

value of the current stock of debt is equal to the (expectation of) the
present discounted value of future primary (non-interest) surpluses.

This is

the same as (III.4), with lim dropped.
T~w
We believe that the analogy with the finite-horizon case is potentially
misleading.

It is by no means obvious what are, in an economy without a

terminal date, the feasible debt strategies of an infinite-lived government
facing an infinite sequence of finite-lived overlapping generations (see e.g.
Shell [1971] and Wilson [1981]).

As we shall see, without a-priori

restrictions on taxes and transfers, our model has a surprising range of

9

feasible debt strategies, many of which allow for Ponzi finance.

Formally,

Ponzi finance can be defined as follows for our model:

Definition 1: Ponzi finance.
The government engages in Ponzi finance if
(III.5}

15

The government engages in Ponzi finance if, in each period, t, the value
of the debt carried into the next period, t+1, is at least as large as the
cost of servicing the debt carried into period t.

From the government's

single-period budget identity it follows, that a government engages in Ponzi
finance if Gt - (7!Lt + 7~_1Lt_1) ~ 0 for all t, that is, if it never runs a
primary (non-interest) budget surplus.
In Section IV we are also interested in sequences of new debt minus old
debt service, {ptBt+l - (1 + rJpt-lBt}~=O that, while not themselves Ponzi
schemes, possess infinite subsequences {Pt.Bt.+l - (1 + rt)Pt.-lBt}~-=O that
J J

J

J

J J

are Ponzi schemes.
We proceed by investigating what kind of constraints the model of Section
II imposes on the government's ability to issue debt.

Equation (II.8),

stating that the savings of the young in period t equal the sum of the capital
stock and the value of the stock of government debt carried into period t+1,
can be rearranged as equation (III.6)
(III.6)

1

1

ptBt+l + 7tLt= - Kt+l + [wt - ct]Lt

Equation (II.3b) (holding with equality), stating that the old consume
all their after-tax resources, can be arranged as equation (III.7)
(III. 7)

(l+rt+1)Pt 8t+1 -

7

2

2

t 1t-1 = -(l+pt+1)Kt+1 + ctLt

10

It is immediately obvious from (III. 6) that, for given Kt+ , wt,
1

ci and

Lt, the value of the public debt issued in period t, ptBt+l can be made

arbitrarily large (positive or negative) by making matching large (positive or
negative) period t transfers to the young, -riLt.

Such an arbitrarily large

(positive or negative) value of ptBt+l is consistent with equation (III.7) for
given rt+l' Kt+l' Pt+l'

cf and Lt,

as long as period t+l taxes on the old, r~Lt

are assigned a matching large (positive or negative value).
Since ct1 and Kt+l are non-negative, the constraint on public debt implied
by (III.6) is ptBt+l + r!Lt ~ wtLt.

There also is a lower bound on the

amount of public debt that can be issued (or an upper bound on the stock of
public credit to the private sector).
consumption by the old in period t.

It follows from non-negativity of
From the resource constraint

Kt+l - Kt= wtLt + ptKt - c!Lt - c~_1Lt-l - Gt and c~-l ~ 0 it follows that
(wt - c!)Lt - Gt+ (1 + Pt)Kt - Kt+l > 0 . From (III.6) this implies
1

ptBt+l + 7 t 1t ~ Gt - (l+pt)Kt
These upper and lower bounds on the public debt in each period, together
with the requirement that exhaustive public spending cannot be negative and
cannot exceed the total physical resources available in any period, constitute
our definition of feasible fiscal policy.

A solvent government is a

government whose fiscal policy is feasible in a world with rational private
agentst6.

Definition 2: Government solvency.
A government is solvent if and only if its debt, taxes, transfer payments
and exhaustive spending satisfy, for all t
(III.Ba}
or, equivalently

1

~

0

ptBt+l + r tLt ~ wtLt

11

{III.Ba')
and
{III.Bb)
or1 equivalently1
(III.Bb')
Equations {Ill.Ba and b) plus non-negativity of Gt imply:
(III.Be)

0 ~ Gt ~ wtLt

+

{l+pJKt

Note that this definition of solvency can be generalized easily to all
OLG models with finite household horizons.

It relies only on the reasonable

postulate that in the last period of its life, each household disposes of all
real and financial assets (including public debt) and pays off any debts it
has carried into that period and does not purchase any new assets or incur any
new debt.
Since the government solvency constraint is derived from the requirement
1

2

that ct, ct-land Kt~ 0 for all t

~

O, another way of interpreting it is that

the government refrains from policies that will bankrupt the private sector:
it does not select sequences for taxes, transfer payments, debt and exhaustive
spending that will cause the non-negativity constraints on consumption by both
generations and on the capital stock to become binding17.

The solvency conditions (III.Sa and b') can be rewritten as
(III. 9a)

ptBt+l + T!Lt

~ [f(kt) - ktf'(kt)]Ot(1+n)t

T~_1Lt-l - (1+rt)Pt-lBt ~ [1+f'(kt)]kt0t(1+n)t
Equation (III.9a) implies that the long-run growth rate of the total

(III.9b')

resource transfer from the young generation to the government (whether through
purchases by the young of government debt or through taxes on the young)
cannot exceed the long-run growth rate of efficiency labor.

Note that there

is no constraint on ptBt+l or T!Lt separately, only on their sum.

12

Equation (III.9b') implies that the long-run growth rate of the total
resource transfer from the old generation to the government (whether through
explicit taxes on the old or through the servicing of debt to the government
incurred by the old) cannot exceed the long-run growth rate of efficiency
2
labor. Note that there is no constraint on rt_
1Lt-l or (1+rt)Pt_1Bt
separately, only on their sum.
If the long-run interest rate exceeds the long-run growth rate of
efficiency labor (lim At0t(1+n)t
t~rn
(III.Sa and b) imply

=

0) then the solvency constraints

1

lim inf {At[ptBt 1 + rtLt]} < 0
t'~rn i'~t~rn
+
1
lim sup {At[ptBt 1 + rtLt]} > O,
t'~rn i'~t~rn

+

If the limit inferior and the limit superior are the same, we get
lim At[ptBt+l + r{Lt] = lim [r~_1Lt-l - (1+rt)Pt_1Bt]
t~rn
t~rn
Note how this differs from the conventional solvency constraint

(III.10)

=0

lim AtptBt+l = 0. Equation (III.10) states that the present discounted value
t~rn
of the total resource transfer from the young to the government and the
present discounted value of the total resource transfer from the old to the
government should converge to zero.

Without further restrictions on

r{

and

1 , equation (III.10) does not constrain the behavior of the public debt or
the public credit in the long run.
7~_

Ponzi finance with unrestricted taxes and transfers: a simple example.

As a simple illustration of the kind of borrowing policies that are
feasible with unrestricted taxes and transfers, consider the deterministic
version of our model with a logarithmic utility function,

13

1

2
v(ct) + Pv(ct)

=

(1-n)lnct1 + nlnct2

, O < n < 1.

The consumer's equilibrium

in this case is given by
(III.11)
(III.12)
(III.13)
7

1

2

t
= [n(wt - rt) + (1-n)1+rt+1]Lt

Consumption when young and old, c! and c~, are functions only of the
2

7
present discounted value of life-time resources, wt - rt1 t
Saving by
1+rt+1
the young (their aggregate demand for government bonds and real capital),

however, is, for well-know life-cycle reasons, not a function of the present
discounted value of life-time resources alone.

We can rewrite (III.13) as

follows:
[ (

n wt

2
7t
1
- r - -,----) +

t

1+rt+1

2
7t

-,-----JL
1+rt+1 t

The young of period twill demand more financial assets, cet. par., if
they expect to have to pay a larger tax Tt2 when they are old, regardless of
the present discounted value of their life-time resources.

The demand for

saving by the young depends on the actual distribution of disposable
(after-tax) resources over the lifetime.

They will save more while young if

the distribution of lifetime disposable resources is skewed towards youth.

If

the government has the ability to tax the members of any given generation
differently when they are young than when they are old, it can influence the
savings behavior of the young and with it the demand for its debt.

By raising

14

2

2

~

1

1

~

[-nTt + (1-n) 1
]Lt while keeping Tt + 1
and Gt constant, the
+rt+1
+rt+1
government can raise saving by the young by any amount without affecting
consumption by the young or the old (or the demand for capital as a productive
input).

The government can therefore increase its debt without bound.

Consider two equilibria, the single-star equilibrium and the double-star
equilibrium.

Assume that (III.14) holds for all t

~

O, and that the initial

capital stock K0 and the sequence of exhaustive public spending in the two
equilibria are identical.
2**
2*
Tt
Tt
1**
1*
+
+
(III.14)
Tt
*
** = Tt 1+rt+1
1+rt+1
For concreteness, let the single-star equilibrium have a balanced budget 1n
each period and zero public debt, that is
1*
2*
*
7 t Lt+ 7 t-1Lt-1 = Gt and Bt = 0 for all t > 0
2**
'We define Tt1** and Tt-l
as follows:
1**
1*
2**
2*
Tt -- Tt - ct and 7 t-1 = 7 t-1+ (l+rt)ct-1
It follows that

(III.15)

**
**
1**
2**
Pt 8t+1 - (l+rt)Pt-1 8t = Gt - [7 t Lt+ 7 t-1Lt-1]
1*
2*
= Gt - [(Tt - ct)Lt + (Tt-1+ (1+rt)ct-1)Lt-1]
=

[(1+n)ct - (1+rt)ct-1]Lt-1

18

Thus, by choosing appropriately growing values for ct' t ~ O, (that is
1
values such that ct/ct-l > (1+n)- (1+rt)), we can raise the growth rate of
public debt in any period to any level.

Since the present discounted value of

lifetime taxes is the same in the single star and the double star equilibrium,
the equilibrium private consumption sequences are the same, and so will be the
wage rate, capital stock, interest rate and debt price sequences.

By making a

larger transfer to the young of generation t, the government provides the

15

young with the means for increasing their saving.

By levying a larger tax on

that same generation when old, the government provides the young with an
incentive to save in order to pay these higher taxes.
1**
1*
2**
*1
Since rt Lt= rt Lt - ctLt and Tt-lLt-l = -Tt Lt+ (1+rt)ct-lLt-l + Gt ,
we note that when a Ponzi game is played (ctfct-l > (1+n)-1 (1+rt)), the total
tax on the young, r!**Lt, will ultimately become negative and increasingly
2**
large in absolute value, while the tax on the old, Tt-lLt-l'
will become an
increasingly large positive number.

We will therefore see the lifetime

pattern of taxes becoming one of ever increasing receipts of transfer payments
when young

and ever increasing tax payments when old.

The lifetime pattern

of taxes therefore has to change sign or zig-zag.
It is obvious that this property generalizes to any finite household
horizon OLG model: what is required is that in the last period of a
household's life, the government be able to recoup in present value terms the
non-balanced budget component of what it has transferred to the household 1n
the earlier periods of its life.
Another way of interpreting this is that the debt can grow without bound
(and at a rate higher than the interest rate) without affecting the
equilibrium allocations for consumption and the capital stock, because the
government can, effectively, tax the debt held by the old to pay for the
servicing of the debt held by the old.

Government debt held by the old

increases the "base" on which lump-sum taxes on the old can be levied

19

McCallum [1984], made this point in the context of an infinite-lived
representative agent model (see also Bohn [1991]).

Government solvency and Ponzi finance with and without restrictions on taxes
and transfers.

16

The same point can be made slightly more generally by considering the
full set of equilibrium conditions for our model.

Given kO and
, Ob0 = (1+r O)p_1bO, a competitive equilibrium of the two-period OLG model
satisfies equations (III.16) to (III.2O) for all t > 0.
(III.16)

v'(c!)

= /3Et[(l + f'(kt+l)]v'(c~)]

(III.18)

(III.19)

1
{0df(kt) - k/' (kt)] - ,!(et) - c!}ot
(kt+l + Pt bt+l)(l+n)(1+wt+1)

(III. 20)

Ptbt+l(l+n)(1+wt+1)

= 't (et) bt

+ gt - Ot1 [ ,!(et) + (l+n)-1,;_1 (et)]
= (l+rt)Pt-1bt + gt - 8t 1 [,!(et) + (l+n)-l,;_1 (et)]

It is clear by inspection of equations (III.16) to (III.19), that given
the initial capital stock and government debt service, and for a give sequence
of exhaustive public spending gt, the solutions for consumption, c~ and c~_ ,
1
and the capital-labor ratio (in efficiency units), kt+i' for all t ~ 0 are
influenced by the remaining budgetary variables (taxes, transfers, public debt
issues and public debt service) only through two terms. The first is
(1+wt+i)(1+n)ptbt+i + 1,~, the total resource transfer from the young 1n

o;

period t to the government, both through purchases of government debt and
through explicit taxes. The second is (1+rt)Pt_ bt - (1+n)-1ot: ,~_
1
1 1
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= 'ltbt

-1 rt-l
2
+ gt - (1+n ) -1 Ot_
, the total resource trans f er f rom the
1

government to the old in period t, both through debt service and through
explicit transfers to the old.
-1 1

Note that, from (III.20), (1+n)(1+wt+l)ptbt+l + Ot rt
2 : what the government takes f rom the young in any
=gt+ 'lt bt - (1+n )-19-1
t rt-l
given period, whether through borrowing or through taxes, it must either use
to finance its exhaustive spending program or give to the old, through debt
service or transfer payments.

What the single-period government budget

2
identity in (III.20) implies for the behavior of ptbt+l' 'ltbt, rt1 and rt-l

individually, is of no interest from the point of view of the behavior of
consumption and the capital stock, once we know the behavior of
2 .
( 1+n ) ( 1+wt+1 ) ptbt+1 + ot-1 rt1 or of 'ltbt - (1+n )-1 ot-1 rt-1
Ve now investigate how the solvency constraint, given in
(III.8a,b and c), is affected by various restrictions on the ability of the
government to set age- and time-contingent taxes and transfers.

Ve also

investigate how such restrictions affect the government's ability to run Ponzi
schemes and the implications for resource allocation of feasible Ponzi
schemes.

Case 1: Unrestricted age- and time-contingent taxes and transfers.

When there are no restrictions, other than those implied by
(III8.a and b) on taxes and transfers, we can establish the following result.

Proposition 1.
With unrestricted age-, time- and state-contingent taxes and transfers,
any equilibrium for consumption by the young and the old and for the
capital stock, can be supported with an infinity of Ponzi schemes.
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Proof: We assert that, if there exists an equilibrium (the single star

2*
.
* Pt,
* 7tl* , 7t2* , b*t f or t
equ1·1·b
1 r1um,
say ) ctl* , ct-l'
wt* , k*t' rt,
given feasible sequence of exhaustive public spending, gt, t

~

~

O, f or a

O, then there

also exist, for the same sequence of exhaustive public spending, (infinitely
1** 2** ** ** ** **
many) equilibria (the double star equilibria) ct , ct-l' wt , kt , rt , Pt ,
1** 2**
**
1**
1* 2**
2*
**
*
Tt , Tt
, bt fort~ 0 such that ct
= ct , ct-l = ct-l' wt = wt,
**
* **
* **
*
** *
** *
-1
-1
kt = kt, rt = rt, Pt = Pt and Pt bt+1 - Pt-1bt(1+n) (1+wt+1)
>
** ** *
1
1
rt Pt_1bt(1+n)- (1+wt+l)- for all t ~ O
For the double star taxes and debt to support the same consumption and
capital stock equilibrium, it is necessary and sufficient that
1 * *
-1 1*
-1 * **
-1 1**
(III.21a) (1+n)(1+wt+l)- ptbt+l + 0t Tt = (1+n)(1+wt+l) ptbt+l + 0t Tt
or
(III.21b)

for all t

~

0.

For the debt to grow at least as fast as the rate of interest forever, it
must be true that for all t ~ 0
* **
* **
(III.22)
(1+n)(1+wt+l)ptbt+ 1-(1+rt+l)Pt-lbt

=

-1 1** 2**
-1
gt-0t [7t +7t_1 (1+n) ] ~ 0

The two choice variables during period tin equation (III.22) are 7!**
2**
2**
1**
and 7t_1 . No matter what value is assigned to 7t-l
, 7t can always be
assigned a large enough negative value to ensure that (III.22) is satisfied:
the debt grows at least as fast as the rate of interest.
From the single-period government budget identity, it follows that
(III.21a) and (III.21b) are the same constraint. No matter what value 1s
1**
2**
assigned to 7t , a value can be assigned to 7t-l
that ensures that
1* 2*
*
*
**
**
(III.21a,b) are satisfied for any values of 7t , 7t-l' bt , bt+l' bt and bt+l
.□

Another way of putting this is that, by increasing -7t1** Lt for any given
2**
**
values of 7t-lLt-l and Gt and for any inherited value of (l+rt)Pt-lBt , it is
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possible to raise the growth rate of the public debt to any positive level

** + Tt1** Lt, the term on the left-hand
without affecting ptBt+i
side of the
2** Lt can then be chosen to ensure that
7t_
1
**
2**
(1+rt)Pt_1Bt - 7t_1Lt-i' the term on the left-hand side of (III.Sa' and b')
satisfies these inequalities. The government simply reshuffles a constant
solvency constraints (III.Sa and b).

** + Tt1** Lt,
total resource transfer away from the young in period t, ptBt+
1
**
1**
between borrowed resources, ptBt+i' and explicit taxes, Tt Lt. Appropriating
for its own use an amount of resources equal to the value of exhaustive public
spending, Gt' it pays out the remainder to the old, either as debt service,

**

2**

or as transfers -Tt_1Lt. Again it is only the total,
2**
**
(1+rt)Pt-1Bt - 7t_1Lt that matters for the consumption of the old.
(1+rt)Pt-1Bt

Corollary.
With unrestricted taxes and transfers, the competitive equilibrium model
with the finite-lived OLG household sector does not require any bounds on the
level or rate of growth of public debt.

Ponzi finance is therefore always possible 1

regardless of the relationship between the interest rate and the growth rate 1
regardless of whether the economy is dynamically efficient and regardless of
whether the economy is Pareto-efficient.

Case 2: Restrictions on differences in taxes and transfers in any period for
overlapping generations.

Three interesting restrictions fitting this category come to mind.
(a) Equal taxes or transfers per generation for all generations alive
during any given period.

7~_1 for all t ~ 0. In Section (IV) we show that
this restriction does not bite. The long-run growth rate of the debt (over
In this case 7!(1+n)

=
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2-period intervals) equals the interest rate, even when the interest rate is
above the growth rate of efficiency labor.

Such Ponzi finance subsequences

are "essential": without them the restrictions on taxes and transfers would
affect the equilibria that can be supported.
(b) Equal per capita taxes or transfers for all generations alive during
any given period.

In this case

r{

=

2

rt-l for all t

restriction too does not bite.

~

0.

In Section (IV) we show that this

The long-run growth rate of the debt (over 2

period intervals) equals the sum of the interest rate and the growth rate of
the labor force.

Essential Ponzi finance subsequences therefore play a role

whenever the growth rate of the labor force is non-negative.
(c) Equal taxes per unit of efficiency labor for all generations alive
during any given period.

r!

(1+wt)r~_1 for all t ~ 0. In Section (IV) we also show
this restriction to be toothless. The long-run growth rate of the debt (over
In this case

=

2-period intervals) is the sum of the interest rate and the growth rate of
efficiency labor.

Such Ponzi finance subsequences are essential.

What drives these results is that even though the two generations (the
young and the old) alive in any given period are treated in the same way
during that period, we can still vary taxes and transfers freely over the
life-cycle of each generation, making transfer payments to them while young
and taxing them when old.

Case 3: Restrictions on variations in taxes and transfers over its lifetime
for any given generation.

The most interesting restriction is that net taxes in each of the two
periods of a household's life must have the same sign, that is
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At~ 0 for all t

~

0.

We need just one of the weak inequalities of the solvency constraint in
order to show that, under this restriction, Ponzi finance is possible only if
the interest rate is below the growth rate of efficiency labor.

Consider

equations (III.Sa) and (III.Sa'), rewritten for this case as

~ [f(kt) - ktf'(kt)]0tLt - 7!Lt
(III.23b) (1+rt+l)ptBt+l ~ [f(kt+l) - kt+lf'(kt+l)]0t+lLt+l + At7!Lt - Gt+l
(III.23a)

ptBt+l

From (III.23a), the only way for the debt to grow faster than the growth
rate of efficiency labor forever, is for 7! to be negative and for -7! to grow
at a rate higher than the growth rate of labor productivity.

If the debt

grows faster than the growth rate of efficiency labor forever, (III.23b) can
only be satisfied if At7!Lt is positive and has a growth rate higher than the
growth rate of efficiency labor.

That is impossible since At~ 0.

Ve

conclude that -7! can grow no faster than the growth rate of labor
productivity and that the growth rate of the debt can therefore be no higher
than the growth rate of efficiency labor.

The debt can therefore grow faster

than the interest rate forever only if the interest rate is below the growth
rate of efficiency labor.
Note that Case 3 includes quite a variety of fiscal rules, including per
capita taxes (or transfers) constant across generations at a point in time,
and growing over time at a constant proportional rate v, that is 7! = 7~_ =
1
7t = 70 (1+v)t for all t ~ 0. Note that our argument implies that v cannot be
permanently higher that the growth rate of labor productivity.
Blanchard and Veil [1992] considered the special case of this model where
the labor force is constant (n = 0), there is no productivity growth (0t = 0
for all t

~

0), there is no exhaustive public spending (Gt= 0 for all t > 0)

and there are no taxes or transfers (7 = 0).
0

In their model, debt obviously
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cannot grow faster than wage income in the long run.

In the deterministic

version of their model, this means that only in a dynamically inefficient
equilibrium can there be viable Ponzi schemes, with the public debt growing
forever at least as fast as the interest rate but no faster than the growth
rate of labor income.
In general (that is, even if net taxes can change sign over the life
cycle), if the long-run rate of interest exceeds the long-run growth rate of
the disposable income of the young (wages net of taxes on the young), that is,
if

lim {At[Ot(f(kt)-ktf'(kt)) -r!J (1+n)t} = 0 , equations (III.Sa, or a')

t---lrn

imply
(III. 24)

lim inf {AtptBt+l} ~ 0
t ---l[D t t ((D
From the public credit constraint (III.Sb) or (III.Sb') it follows that,
I

I~

if the long-run rate of interest exceeds the rate of growth of the disposable
income of the old (capital income minus taxes on the old), that is, if
lim {At[(1+f'(kt))kt0t-(1+ n)-1r~_1J (1+n)t} = O 20, we have
t---lrn
(III.25)

lim sup

i'---lrn i'~t~rn

If lim

t

I

lim AtptBt+l

t---lrn

inf

---l(D i'~t~rn
=

0.

{AtptBt+l} ~ 0

{AtptBt 1}
+

=

lim sup

{AtptBt+l}

i'---lrn i'~t~rn

=

O, then we also have

This means that when the long-run rate of interest exceeds

the long-run growth rate of the disposable income of the young and of the old,
the conventional solvency constraint emerges.
If the taxes paid (transfers received) by each generation are
distortionary, it is unlikely that the long-run growth rate of per capita
taxes (transfers) can exceed the long-run growth rate of productivity.

There

will be some finite upper bound on the ratio of taxes and transfers per
generation to the real (physical) resources owned by that generation.

Tax
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administration and collection costs that are strictly convex functions of the
amount of taxes raised, will also put a finite upper bound on the ratio of
taxes paid to real resources owned (see Barro [1976], McCallum [1984], Kremers
[1989] and Bohn [1991]).
We summarize the foregoing discussion in the following Proposition:

Proposition 2.

The conventional government solvency constraint (l i m AtPtBt+ 1

OJ21 is implied

t-1 (D

by our solvency constraint (III.Ba,b and c) if
(a) The long-run interest rate exceeds the long-run growth rate of efficiency
labor (lim At6/1+n/ = OJ
t-irn

and
(b) Either, the net tax paid by any generation at a given age cannot change sign
over the lifetime of that generation,
or, the long-run growth rate of taxes paid or transfers received at a given
age by a generation is less than the long-run rate of interest.

In order for the public debt to grow at least as fast as the rate of
interest forever, when the rate of interest is above the growth rate of
efficiency labor, it must be possible to make transfer payments to a
generation when it is young and to tax it when it is old; in addition, the
growth rate of these taxes and transfers must be at least as high as the
interest rate 22 •

Note that it is only the taxes on or transfers to each

generation that must have a growth rate at least as high as the interest rate.
1
2
Aggregate taxes net of transfers, rtLt
+ rt-lLt , need not grow at all, as

Case 4 below makes clear.

24

Case 4: Restrictions on how taxes can change from period to period.
We consider the example of age-specific taxes growing at a common (but
not necessarily constant) growth rate, that is 7! = 7!_ (1+wt) and
1
2
2
7t-l = 7t_2 (1+wt) for all t ~ 0. This is an interesting case because in many
models, taxes on the young will grow, from one generation to the next, at the
same rate as taxes on the old in steady state.

We define

t

wt= IJ(1+wj), t

~ o.

J·=o

In this case the relevant solvency constraints become
1
t
Gt- (l+pt)Kt ~ ptBt+1 + 70wt(l+n) ~ wtLt
-(1+pt)Kt ~ (1+rt)Pt_1Bt - 7_21wt ( 1+n) t-1 ~ wtLt - Gt
2 = 0 . As long
. and 7_2 pos1. t 1ve,
.
Let 710 be negat 1ve
w1.th 710 + (1+n )-17_
1
1
as wt is positive, the public debt always grows at least as fast as the rate
.

of interest, since ptBt+l - (1+rt)Pt_1Bt = Gt - [7 01 + (1+n) -1 7_21Jwt(1+n) t and
Gt~ 0. The actual value of Wt (and thus of wt) each period can be chosen so
as to keep ptBt+l + 76Wt(1+n)t invariant under different choices of Wt' and
independent of the growth rate of of ptBt+l'
Despite these restrictions, we can still make transfer payments to the
young and impose taxes on the old.

In addition, we can choose, each period,

the common growth rate of per capita taxes on the old and per capita transfer
payments to the young.

If Gt= 0 for all t, we can make the growth rate of

public debt exactly equal to the interest rate each period.

(IV) THREE EQUIVALENCE RESULTS.
We can now can state our first equivalence result:

Proposition 3.
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Given initial values k

O

equilibrium for pt' kt'

and b

O

and a feasible sequence gt' t

c! and c1

~

0 , any

with arbitrary paths of debts b t and of

lump-sum taxes and transfers r! and

r!

~

for all t

1 can be replicated without

debt and deficits, that is by using balanced-budget lump-sum taxes and transfers
only.

What this means is that, in a deterministic model, any intergenerational
redistribution that can be supported by debt and taxes can also be supported just
with taxes and without debt.

In the stochastic case it is true in addition that any

intergenerational insurance supported with public debt, unbalanced budgets and age
and generation-dependent lump-sum taxes can also be provided with a balanced
budget and without public debt.

Proof: An equilibrium is characterized for all t

~

0 by equations (III .16) to

(III.20), the government solvency constraint given in (III.Sa, b, and c) and
initial conditions k

0

and b . Ve rewrite the first two inequalities of the
0

solvency constraint as follows:
(IV .1a)
or
(IV.lb)
(IV.2a)
or
(IV.2b)
The proof is direct and canst ruct i ve.

Ve first consider a "reference

equilibrium" supported by given sequences of taxes and debt, denoted by single
overbars.

Next we propose an alternative set of sequences of taxes and debt

(denoted by double overbars), which include the balanced-budget, zero public debt
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sequences.

Finally, we check by direct computation that the double overbar

sequences support the same equilibrium sequences of consumption and capital
accumulation as the single overbar sequences (note that exhaustive public

-1
Formally, consider paths bt , Ti

spending is the same under both policies).
and;~ for all t

~

t

and b .
0
0

~

1 for given k

0 that support equilibrium paths Pt

kt ,

'

c! and

c~ for all

We show that for any other set of debt paths

=

bi , t

~

1, there exists associated paths for lump-sum taxes and transfers

-1
-2
Ti and Ti, t
fort~ 1.

~ 0

1
2
that support the same equilibrium paths Pt, kt , ct and ct

Let the double overbar debt and tax sequences satisfy (IV. 3) and

(IV.4)

(IV.3)

pt(bt+l - bt+l) = [ 1!n]0t:1[:;:{(et) - ~{]

(IV . 4 )

[;~ - ;~(et)] = 'Yt+1 ( 8 t+1) [bt+1 - bt+1l 8t+1 (l + n)

Equations

(IV.5)

for all t >

O

(IV.3) and (IV.4) imply (IV.5)
-[;~ -

~~(et)] = 7t)'\.iir;~ - ~~(et+1l]
=1

1

[=2

+ rt+l Tt -

l

-2
T/8t+l)

for all t ~ O 23

Equation (IV.3) ensures that the economy-wide capital market equilibrium
condition (III.19) will be satisfied for the same values of Pt, ct1 , ct2 and kt
(and therefore also the same values of wt).

Equation

budget constraint of the old in period t given in
for the same values of

2
ct , kt+l and rt+l

(IV.4) ensures that the

(III.18) will be satisfied

It is easily verified that the

government budget identity in (III. 20) will also be satisfied under the double
overbar policies.

Finally, it is obvious that if the government solvency

constraint is satisfied for the single overbar policy it will also be satisfied for the
double overbar policy.
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The remaining equilibrium conditions (III.16), and (III.17) also hold
=

under the double overbar policy. To get Proposition 1 we set bt

t >

=

0 for all

1. □

Thus any equilibrium with government debt and deficits can be replicated
by an economy in which the government budget is balanced period-by-perio d (and
the stock of debt is zero) by appropriate age-specific lump-sum taxes and
transfers.
It can be checked easily that, if the conventional government solvency
constraint (III.3) is satisfied under the single overbar policy, it is also
satisfied under the double overbar policy.

The validity of Proposition 3,

unlike that of Proposition 4 and its Corollaries below, is therefore not
dependent on the acceptability of our generalized solvency constraint.

The

reason is that under the double overbar policy in the proof of Proposition 2,
taxes and transfers are not in any way restricted.
Proposition 3 is a generalization of the well-known proposition that an
equilibrium with positive public debt financed by taxes on the young is
equivalent to a balanced budget, pay-as-you-go (or unfunded) social security
retirement scheme in which lump-sum taxes on the young are paid out as
lump-sum transfers to the old.

Calvo and Obstfeld [1988a,b] proved it for a

non-stochastic model.

Corollary 1.

With unrestricted lump-sum taxes and transfers, public debt is redundant
or "inessentiaf', that is, it does not permit additional equilibria to be
supported.
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Corollary 2.
With unrestricted taxes and transfers, Ponzi finance is "inessential",
that is, it does not permit additional equilibria to be supported.

Proposition 4.
Given an initial value k

0

and a sequence of exhaustive public spending gt' t

any equilibrium for Pt, kt , c~ and c!_1 for all t

~ 0

~

0,

supported by age- and

time-dependent lump-sum taxes and transfers but without public debt and with
balanced public sector budgets, can also be supported with age-independent (equal
per capita for both generations alive in any given period) lump-sum taxes and
transfers, provided unbalanced public sector budgets are allowed.

This means that any intergenerational redistribution and intergenerational
insurance supported with balanced-budget age-dependent lump-sum taxes and
transfers, can also be supported with age-independent lump-sum taxes and tranfers
but with unbalanced public sector budgets.

Note that, from Proposition 3, there

is no loss of generality in taking the benchmark equilibrium of Proposition 4
to have a balanced budget and zero public debt.
We shall give a detailed proof only for the case where the unbalanced
budget, age-independent tax-transfer policy involves equal per capita taxes on
both generations alive in any given period (Case 2b) of our taxonomy in
Section III.

The proofs for equal taxes per generation (Case 2a) and equal

taxes per efficiency unit of labor (Case 2c) are virtually identical.

Proof: Variables with single overbars represent the benchmark balanced-budget

policy with age-dependent taxes and transfers.

Variables with double overbars

represent the age-independent tax/transfer case with an unbalanced budget.
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From equation (III.18) it follows that, if equivalence holds, it must be
true that
(IV. 7)
From (IV.7) and the government's single-period budget identity, (or
equivalently from the economy-wide capital market equilibrium condition
(III.19)), it follows that, if the double overbar regime supports the same
equilibria as the single overbar regime, it must be true that (IV.8) holds.
(IV.8)
For any 7~ is is clear that a value of rt can be found to satisfy (IV.7)
and (IV.8).

The other equilibrium conditions (III.16) and (III.17) are also

satisfied under the double overbar regime.

The solvency constraint under the

single overbar regime is
(IV.9)
and
(IV.10)
Under the double overbar regime the solvency constraint is
(IV .11)
and
(IV.12)
It is clear from (IV.8) that if the solvency constraint is satisfied under the
single over-bar regime ((IV.9) and (IV.10) hold), then it will also be
satisfied under the double overbar regime ((IV.11) and (IV.12) hold).

□

While this completes the proof of Proposition 4, it is instructive to
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investigate the behavior of taxes and of the public debt under the double
overbar regime.

It turns out that Ponzi finance of a special kind (the

sequence of government debt will have infinite subsequences that grow faster
than the rate of interest forever if the population growth rate is positive),
will in general be necessary for the age-independent tax-transfer regime to
support the same equilibria as the unrestricted tax-transfer regime.

Ponzi

finance is therefore essential under the restricted tax-transfer scheme.
Equations (IV.7) and (IV.8) imply
(IV.13)
At a given rate of interest, the unfunded balanced-budget social security
scheme (the single overbar scheme) increases the period t+1 value of the
lifetime resources of a representative member of generation t by
-(1 + rt+ 1)r~ + (1 + n)r~+l - (1+n)0t+lgt+l· The unbalanced budget scheme
with the age-independent taxes (the double overbar scheme) adds the amount
-rt+l - (1 + rt+l)rt to the period t+1 value of the lifetime resources of a
representative member of generation t.

Equation (IV.13) equates the two.

Note that the homogeneous part of equation (IV.13) changes sign each
period (imparting a saw-tooth pattern) and grows at a proportional rate 1 + r
in absolute value.

The saw-tooth pattern of tax receipts is passed on to the

value of the per capita debt through the government budget identity under the
double overbar policy, given in (IV.14) below.
=

(IV.14)

(IV.15)
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Equation (IV.15) can be rewritten as
(IV.16)
The value of the public debt under the age-independent tax, unbalanced
=

budget policy, ptBt+ 1 , is likely to zig-zag from a positive value in one
period to a negative value in the next. If, for instance, 7! and Lt were
constant over time, the saw-tooth pattern of the public debt, with debt in the
homogeneous equation of (IV.16) having a growth factor of -(1+rt) each period,
(as signaled in Calvo and Obstfeld [1988b] for an economy without population
growth or productivity growth) is immediately apparent.
Over a two-period horizon, the public debt evolves according to
2

(IV.17)

ptBt+ 2 = (1+n) (1+rt+ 1)(1+rt)Pt_1Bt - (1+n) [Gt+ 1 - (1+n)(1+rt+ 1)Gt]
+ (2+n) [7!+ 1 - (1+rt+ 1)7!]Lt+ 1
-1 -1
Consider the simple example where Gt+ 1 =Gt= 0 and -1
rt+ =rt= r f or
1
all t > O. Equation (IV.17) simplifies to
--

-ptBt+ 2 = (1+n) (1+rt+ 1)(1+rt)Pt_1Bt - (2+n)rt+ 1rLt+ 1
When Tis negative (the balanced-budget scheme redistributes from the old
2

to the young) and rt+ 1 is non-negative, the public debt will, over a
two-period horizon grow at a proportional rate at least equal to the sum of
the real interest rate and the growth rate of population.

If n is

non-negative, the sequence of the public debt will therefore have infinite
subsequences that are characterized by Ponzi finance.

Public credit too will,

over a two-period interval, grow at a rate asymptotically equal to the sum of
the interest rate and the growth rate of population.

Note that "subsequence

Ponzi finance" is "essential" in this case.
The total resource transfer of the young generation to the government
under the double overbar regime evolves according to

32

=

ptBt+l + ¥tLt

=
=

-(1+n)(1+rt)(P t_1Bt+¥t_1Lt_1) + r!Lt+(1+n)(1+r t)r!_1Lt_1)

Corollary 1.

Proposition 4. holds when the restriction that per capita taxes are equal
for both generations alive in any given period is replaced by the
restriction that taxes per generation alive in any given period are
equal.

When the age-restricted tax policy is given by Case 2a of Section III,
that is by equal taxes or transfers per generation, or ¥~(1+n)

=

¥~_1 , the

public debt path that supports any balanced budget equilibrium with
unrestricted taxes and transfers is given by
(IV.18)
In the

is constant, the

public debt (and the public credit) will, over a two period horizon, grow
asymptotically at the rate of interest.

Subsequence Ponzi finance is again

"essential".
The total resource transfer of the young generation to the government
under the double overbar regime evolves according to

Corollary 2.

Proposition 4. holds when the restriction that per capita taxes are equal
for both generations alive in any given period is replaced by the
restriction that taxes per efficiency unit of labor in any given period are
equal.
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When the age-restricted tax policy is given by Case 2c of Section III,
that is by equal taxes or transfers per unit of efficiency labor, or
7! = (1+wt)7~_1 , the public debt path that supports any balanced budget
equilibrium with unrestricted taxes and transfers is given by

--

(IV.19)

--

-1

ptBt+l = -(1+wt)(1+n)(1+rt)Pt_1Bt - (1+wt)(1+n)Gt + [2+n+wt(1+n)]rtLt

Again taking the simple example where Gt= 0 and

r! = r1 for all t

~ O,

it is easily seen that over a 2-period interval, the public debt (and the
public credit) will asymptotically grow at the sum of the interest rate, the
growth rate of population and the growth rate of productivity.

If the growth

rate of efficiency labor is non-negative, Ponzi finance will be feasible and
"essential".
The total resource transfer of the young generation to the government
under the double overbar regime evolves according to
=

=

Pt 8t+1 + 7tLt = -(l+wt)(l+n)(l+rt)(Pt-1 8t+ 7t-1Lt-1)
+ r!Lt+ (1+wt)(1+n)(1+rt)r!_1Lt-l
Proposition 5.

Given an initial value k and a sequence of exhaustive public spending gt'
0
t ~ 0, any equilibrium for pt' kt ,
and c:_ 1 for all t ~ 0 that can be

c{

supported with a balanced budget and unrestricted lump-sum taxes and
transfers, can also be supported with taxes and transfers that are
required to have the same sign during the lifetime of each generation,
provided unbalanced budgets are allowed.

Proof: Under the balanced budget (single overbar) reference policy,
-1

-2

Bt = 0 and rtLt + rt_1Lt-l = Gt for all t

~

0.

Under the double overbar
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=

policy, we have ptBt+l
At> 0 for all t

~

O.

For the two policies to support the same equilibrium

(and for the double overbar policy to satisfy the solvency constraint if the
=
single overbar policy satisfies it) it must be the case that ptBt+l+ =1
rtLt = -1
Tt

-

=2

-2

(or equivalently that (1+rt)Pt_1Bt - Tt_1Lt-l = -Tt_1Lt_1).
The behavior of the public debt under the double overbar policy is
governed by
(IV.20)
Noting that
=

=1
-1
Pt-1Bt + 7 t-1 1t-1 = 7 t-1 1t-1 '
we see that equations (IV.20) and (IV.21) can be satisfied through the
(Iv. 21 )

-1
appropriate choice of (positive or negative) values for Pt_ Bt
1 and rt-l' for
any given positive value of At-land exogenously given feasible values of -1
Tt'
-1

Tt-l and Gt. □
Consider, for instance, the special case where At= 1, that is there

either has to be an equal tax or an equal transfer each period over the
lifetime of each generation.

Equation (IV.20) then simplifies to

(
)-1[-1
7 t 1 t + -1
7 t-1 1t-1 - Gt ]
Pt-1Bt = 2+rt
Since the stock of debt can be negative as well as positive, the restriction
that

T!

and

7~

must have the same sign (or even be equal), does not prevent

the government from replicating any equilibrium supported by a balanced budget
policy with unrestricted taxes and transfers.
Since, by assumption, taxes paid to the government cannot change sign
over the life cycle, Ponzi finance is only possible under the double overbar
policy if the interest rate is below the growth rate of efficiency labor.

35

This is obvious from (IV.20), as -1
rtLt + Jt_1-1
rt_1Lt-l - Gt cannot h ave a
long-run growth rate in excess of the growth rate of efficiency labor.
Proposition 3 states that public debt and deficits (and by implication
Ponzi finance) are redundant policy instruments as long as the fiscal
authority has unrestricted age-specific lump-sum taxes and transfers.
Proposition 4 and its two Corollaries and Proposition 5 emphasize that a
fiscal authority with a restricted tax-transfer instrumentarium may be able to
use public debt and deficits as perfect substitutes for the missing
age-specific taxes and transfers, provided the government solvency constraint
is specified as in (III.8a,b and c).

Essential (subsequence) Ponzi finance

may be a feature of these government borrowing and lending strategies (vide
Proposition 4 and its Corollaries).
Our approach to government solvency has implications for the empirical
approaches to testing for government solvency (see e.g. Hamilton and Flavin
[1986], Wilcox [1989], Corsetti [1990] , Grilli [1990] and Buiter and Patel [1991]).
All these papers used variants of the convergence-in-expectation version of the

conventional solvency criterion given in (III. 3b), involving the long-run behavior
of the discounted public debt, that is, they tested Tl im15t_1+TPt-l+Tbt+T 1
(1+n)- 1 im~t-l+TPt-l+TBt+T

-I rn

=

0 (or its expectational counterpart).

T-1rn

We have seen that even in economies in which the long-run rate of
interest exceeds the long-run growth rate of efficiency labor, Ponzi finance
may be feasible.

As long as (1) the tax burden can vary freely over the life

cycle of each generation (specifically if they can make net positive transfer
payments to a generation when it is young and impose a net positive tax when
it is old, and (2) the transfers and taxes can grow at least as fast as the
rate of interest, the potential for Ponzi finance exists.

Note that the
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empirically unlikely zig-zag pattern of the debt need not occur when the two
generations alive during any given period can be treated differently by the
tax-transfer system (see the proof of Proposition 5).

(V) CONCLUSION.
Merely looking at the stock of public debt, without attempting to
evaluate the total impact of the fiscal-financial policy rules on what
Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff [1991] have called the "generational accounts"
can be very misleading as an indicator of the degree of financial crowding out
pressure in the economy.

Ve showed that, given a sufficiently rich

tax-transfer menu, the government could achieve any desired intergenerational
redistribution and insurance with public debt, without it or indeed with
public credit.

It is when tax-transfer options are constrained that the

option of public borrowing or lending becomes valuable, both for
intergenerational redistribution and for intergenerational insurance.
The tax-smoothing proposition demonstrates how public debt can be useful
for conventional (not uncertainty-related) efficiency reasons in the absence
of non-distortionary taxes and transfers.

Our paper complements this by

showing how public debt can be useful in the pursuit of distributional
objectives and efficient intergenerational insurance schemes, if there is a
restricted menu of lump-sum taxes and transfers.
An important part in the proof of the proposition that government debt
can be used to take over the intergenerational redistribution and insurance
roles of missing age-specific taxes and transfers, was our specification of
the government solvency constraint.

A government is solvent if is does not

pursue policies that force the private sector into bankruptcy when there
exists an alternative policy that would not do so.

The private sector is
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bankrupt when the non-negativity constraints on consumption by the young,
consumption by the old or the capital stock become binding.

The stock of

public debt is limited by the condition that the total amount of resources
taken by the government from the young, whether through borrowing or through
taxes, cannot exceed the wage income of the young.

The stock of public credit

is likewise limited by the condition that the total amount of resources taken
by the government from the old, whether through the old servicing their debt
to the government or through taxes, cannot exceed the capital income of the
old.
Provided the government can make net transfer payments to a generation
when it is young and impose net taxes on that generation when it is old, and
provided these transfer payments and taxes can grow at least at the rate of
interest, Ponzi finance is possible, regardless of the relationship between
the interest rate and the growth rate, and regardless of whether or not the
economy is dynamically inefficient or Pareto efficient.

If either of these

assumptions is violated, our solvency constraint implies (when the long-run
interest rate exceeds the long-run growth rate of efficiency labor) that the
conventional solvency constraint applies: the sequence of public debt
discounted at the rate of interest converges to zero.
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NOTES
1Vith distortionary (non-lump-sum) taxes and transfers, real equilibria
will almost always be affected by the ability, offered by unbalanced budgets,
to vary the pattern over time of the excess burdens associated with the use of
distortionary instruments. See e.g. Barro [1979].
2See Buiter [1990] for a discussion of the roles of different kinds of
heterogeneity in a number of standard OLG models.

3lt is the institution of government that must be infinite-lived, not any
particular set of incumbent politicians. Specifically, what is required that
a government does not repudiate the debt incurred by its predecessors.
4Earlier versions of these propositions can be found in Buiter and Kletzer
[1990, 1991] .
5For an analysis of private intergenerational risk sharing motivated
through altruism see Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoff [1991].
6Apart from the incomplete market participation that is intrinsic to
OLG models without the institution of hereditary slavery, more standard types
of insurance market failures can also create a potential welfare-improving
role for taxes, transfer payments and public debt. For instance, in the presence
of uncertain lifetimes (a feature that is absent from our model), a compulsory social
security retirement scheme can provide an annuity that is actuarially fairer than
those provided by the voluntar~ private annuities market which is adversely affected
by adverse selection (see Abel 1988] and Feldstein (1989)). Eaton and Rosen [1980],
Varian [1980], Feldstein [1988 , Kimball and Mankiw [1989] and Kaplow [1991]
discuss how income taxation can serve as social insurance against uncertainties in
labor income. The positive and welfare consequences of such social insurance will of
course depend on the availability and nature of private insurance arrangements and
the reasons for the absence of a set of complete insurance markets. Typically,
adverse selection problems can be mitigated by compulsory social insurance through
the tax-transfer mechanism while moral hazard problems affect efficient public
provision of insurance as much as private provision.
7Allowing for longer maturity debt would add notation but would not affect
the equivalence results.
8The single-period utility function vis twice continuously differentiable,
strictly
1
concave, increasing in c and c2 and satisfies the Inada conditions.
9Since taxes, coupon payments and the marginal product of capital
can be
stochastic, it may not be possible to satisfy (II. 3a,b) for non-negative values of c~

and/or c~. Vhile labor productivity and the marginal product of capital are
assumed to be positive, it may not be possible to satisfy the constraints
c~ ~ O, c~_1 ~ O, Kt+l ~ 0 and Gt~ 0 for arbitrary public debt, tax and
transfer sequences. Our government solvency constraint is in fact exactly the
constraint that households are not forced into bankruptcy by government
policy.
Note that for arbitrary government policies, private bankruptcy might
occur even if individuals cannot borrow from the government (bd ~ 0), because
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even without private debt to the government, the old might not have enough
resources to pay the stochastic taxes. If the constraints c!, c~ ~ 0 were
imposed, even non-contingent debt issued by private individuals (bd < 0) would in
general be risky debt, with gross rate of return 1 + rt+l if there is no bankruptcy
2

d

2

d

(ct > 0) and gross rate of return max{0, [(1 + Pt+l)kt+l - rt]/(-bt+l)}
otherwise. With or without private debt to the government, the old might not
have enough resources to pay taxes. Assuming that taxes owed to the government
have the same priority as interest owed to the government, actual taxes plus
interest paid by the old would be given by min{r~ + 'Yt+lbt+l' (1 + Pt+l)k~+ 1).
It is even possible that the young would not be able to pay their taxes. This would
be the case if wt plus the maximal amount the young could borrow were less than

r}.

Allowing for this would greatly complicate the exposition but would not affect
our equivalence results, as long as taxes and interest owed would be subject to
the same treatment.
Ve do not impose the constraints kd ~ 0 and bd ~ 0. Since in the
household decision problem kd stands for equity, that is ownership claims to
the stock of physical capital, there is no reason the household cannot go
short in it. Ve could also allow households to issue state-contingent debt.
What we are implicitly assuming in our formal model is that the debt they
issue is identical to government debt. The introduction of private debt does
therefore not increase the asset menu.
11 Note that when debt is riskless, (II.4a,b) imply the familiar risk premium
for capital formula : EtPt+l
rt+l - Covt[Pt+l, v' (c~)], where Covt denotes the
10

Etv'(c~)
conditional variance operator.
12Public consumption can be an argument in the private utility function.
As long as it enters in an additively separable way, it will not affect the
first-order conditions for private consumption. Since we are interested in
characterizing feasible fiscal strategies rather than optimal ones, we model
public consumption as a pure waste of resources. Public sector capital
formation could be added to our list of fiscal instruments in a
straightforward manner and is omitted only because of space limitations.
13 Often the weaker solvency criterion that (III.3) hold in expectation only, is
imposed for stochastic models, that is Et lim b't-l+TPt-l+Tbt+T

= Et

T-+ro

lim &t-l+TPt-l+TBt+T
T~rn

=

0.

Bohn [1990] argues quite convincingly,

however, that the solvency criterion should apply to all realizations of the
discounted debt process, and not just to its mathematical expectation. See
also Blanchard and Veil [1992].
14When only the expectation of the discounted debt is required to go to
zero in the limit, equation (III.4) is replaced by
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7
2
T-1
~
-1 [ 1t +i
[ 1 ] 72
gt+i ] 8
8t-1Pt-1bt = Et} 1. m["""'(Ot+i+1)
l+n + l+n
t+i-1- 1+n t+i]
--ICD

i=O

15If we extended the government financial liability menu, say by allowing
longer maturity debt, the definition would have to be adapted to the specific
set of government debt instruments allowed. The statement that the government
never runs a primary surplus, always defines Ponzi finance.
16This is in the spirit of O'Connell and Zeldes [1988], who point out that
in order for the government to run a "rational" Ponzi scheme, a rational
private sector must be willing to be at the receiving end of such a scheme.
17Note that in our model both the wage rate and the marginal product of
capital are positive, because of we restrict the level of labor-augmenting
productivity to be postive. Without a government sector, private bankruptcy
would therefore not occur. If the technology were to permit private
bankruptcy even without a government, our solvency constraint would be
modified as follows. The government does not select sequences for taxes,
transfer payments, debt and exhaustive spending that will cause the
non-negativity constraints on consumption by both generations and on the
capital stock to become binding if there exist alternative sequences of the
government instruments that would avoid this.

18 Note that the total transfer to the government by the young during period
t evolves according to
** 1**
** 1*
1*
*1
Pt 8t+1+ 7 t 1t = (l+rt)(Pt-1 8t-1+ 7 t-1 1t-1) + [(l+n)rt - (l+rt) 7 t-1] 1t-1
19 Note that such a tax is not perceived by those investing in government
debt as a "tax on debt" affecting expected returns from holding debt, even if
the tax is fully anticipated. It is perceived as lump-sum, that is the amount
paid is perceived as independent of the actions of the tax payer, including
her portfolio choice.
2oor, equivalently, if lim {at[(gt - (1+f'(kt))kt)0t - r!J (1+n)t} = O,
t-+m

21strictly speaking this should be lim inf {atptBt+l} ~ 0 and
t'-+m t'<t<m
lim sup {~tptBt+l} ~ 0. If the lim inf andthe lim sup are both equal to
t '-+m t '< r<m
zero then lim atptBt+l = 0.
t-+m

22What we require, strictly speaking, is the the sequences of taxes and
transfers per generation, {r!Lt}~=O and {r~_1Lt_1}~=0 have infinite
subsequences {r!.1t.}~.=O and {r~ __1)~.=0 whose elements have a growth rate
J

J

J

J

at least as high as the interest rate.
-2

J

-2
23Note that, although rt can depend on et+l and therefore on 0t+l' -2
rt - Tt
can depend only on et and therefore not on Ot+i· If you tax the young more in
period t under the double overbar policy than under the single overbar policy,
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you will borrow less (equation (III.9)). In period t+l the taxes on the old
generation can be lower under the double overbar policy by (l+rt+l) times the
amount by which the taxes they paid in period t (when they were young) were
higher . This leaves the life-time budget constraint unaffected.

